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RECOGNITIONAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL PICKETING
UNDER AMENDMENTS TO THE
TAFT- HARTLEY ACT
THOMAS J. MCDERMOTT*
"The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
... goes beyond the Taft-Hartley Act to legislate a comprehensive
code governing organizational strikes and picketing and draws no
distinction between 'organizational' and 'recognitional' picketing.
While proscribing peaceful organizational strikes in many situa-
tions, it also establishes safeguards against the [Labor] Board's
interference with legitimate picketing activity."' Thus did the
Supreme Court in its recent Curtis decision summarize the purpose
and the scope of the amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act which is
known as Section 8(b) (7). Our task is to develop and expand the
Supreme Court's summary in the light of the statutory language,
the legislative history, and the judicial authority so far available.
In doing so we should be mindful that Section 8(b) (7), although
a major step in an evolving pattern of regulation of union conduct,
is nonetheless only one of many interwoven sections in a complex
social statute. We should also remember that in enacting labor legisla-
tion the ultimate purpose of the Congress is to fashion a coherent
national labor policy and not merely to strike at particular abuses.
The language of Section 8(b) (7) makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for a labor organization or its agents "to picket or cause to be
picketed or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed any employer
where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to
recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representa-
tive of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an
employer to accept or select such labor organization as their collec-
*LL.B. Marquette; LL.M. Georgetown; former Associate General Counsel,
Division of Law of National Labor Relations Board; former Chief Counsel
to Board Member Rodgers of the NLRB; Member of the law firm of Davies,
Hardy & Schenck, New York, N.Y.
1 NLRB v. Teamsters, Local 639, 80 S. Ct. 706, 716, 39 L.C. 69,815, 69,822
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tive bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is
currently certified as the representative of such employees", and
unless certain specified conditions, discussed hereafter, are met.
The choice of language by the Congress is significant.
The use of the terms "to picket or cause to be picketed, or
threaten to picket or cause to be picketed" appear to make Section
8(b) (7) applicable only to picketing and not to strike activity as
such or to other forms of union activity. Thus, a strike for recog-
nition unaccompanied by picketing would not be encompassed by
the Section. Nor would the Section reach a situation where a union
uses consumer boycott techniques short of picketing, as for example,
oral or written appeals for the purpose of forcing recognition.
While the S u p r e m e C o u r t did use the phrase "organizational
strikes" in the summary of Section 8(b) (7) that I quoted at the
outset, I am inclined to believe that the Court had in mind strikes
accompanied by picketing, which was the situation in the Curtis
case.
The use of the term "an employer" in Section 8(b) (7) extends
the Section to both primary and secondary picketing, although the
Section is principally designed to reach primary picketing. Of
course, the need for Section 8(b) (7) in secondary situations is
somewhat academic, since secondary picketing is now adequately
covered by the amended Section 8(b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The use of the term "an object" makes Section 8(b) (7) applicable
to any situation where the picketing has an illegal objective, regard-
less of whether the picketing may also have other legitimate objec-
tives.
The phrase "forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or
bargain with a labor organization" proscribes recognitional picket-
ing. The language used is sufficiently broad to encompass not only
picketing for exclusive recognition, but also for a lesser form of
recognition such as a member's-only contract. The language is
also broad enough to reach picketing for recognition by a majority
union, provided it is not certified, as well as picketing by a minority
union. Thus, in the Charlton Press case,2 involving an injunction
proceeding against the I.T.U., the Court expressly rejected the con-
tention that majority status is itself a defense to a violation of Sec-
tion 8(b) (7).
The phrase "forcing or requiring the employees of an employer
to accept or select such labor organization as their collective bar-
gaining representative" proscribes organizational picketing. Does
2 Green v. Typographical Union and Local 285 (Charlton Press, Inc.), -F.
Supp. -, 39 L.C. 68,940, 68,944 (Conn. 1960). McLeod v. Teamsters, Local
239, 179 F. Supp. 481, 39 L.C. 69,153, 69,158 (E.D. N.Y. 1960).
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Section 8(b) (7) proscribe all forms of organizational picketing-
both the coercive kind and the informational kind, or only the
former? The same question is to be asked of recognitional picket-
ing. That Section 8(b) (7) reaches coercive organizational or recogni-
tional picketing is clear. The instance of picketing most frequently
given in the legislative history is where a "stranger" or minority union
seeks by the sheer pressure of a picket line to compel the employer to
grant recognition or the employees to join the union, irrespective
of his or their wishes.
But suppose that the union in good faith seeks by its picketing
not to "strongarm" but merely to persuade the employer to grant
recognition or the employees to join. Can this picketing be re-
garded as for an object of "forcing or requiring" the employer to
grant recognition or "forcing or requiring" the employees to join?
The answer appears to be yes in both cases, with the possible
exception of the situation covered by the second proviso to Section
8(b) (7) (C) which will be discussed later.
The reasoning for this conclusion is as follows: Picketing,
irrespective of the union's motive, exerts pressure on both em-
ployer and employees alike, because it tends to invite action which
disrupts or curtails the employer's operations and thereby jeopard-
izes the employer's business and the employees' livelihood. Picket-
ing also exerts pressure particularly on employees because it com-
pels them to choose between honoring or ignoring t h e picket
line, a decision which may or may not have inconvenient, if not
unpleasant, consequences. Hence, the foreseeable and necessary
effect of any organizational or recognitional picketing is restraint
and coercion.
This being so, it must follow that the ultimate objective, rather
than the immediate purpose, of the picketing is the touchstone of
Section 8(b) (7). The determinative question then is, what does the
union seek to obtain in the end by picketing, and not what part of
the employer or employees does the union seek to influence-their
intellects or their fears. Otherwise Section 8(b) (7) would become
a legislative nullity. The Section was enacted, as the Court pointed
out in the Charlton Press case, "to provide for the orderly resolu-
tion of disputes over representation of employees by requiring that
such questions be settled by a proper tribunal, rather than through
coercive activities by the antagonists". 3 But this purpose of Con-
gress would be achieved in relatively few cases if, in order to
establish a violation of Section 8(b) (7), independent proof had to
be adduced that the union meant the picketing to have its natural
effect of coercing the employer or employees. In sum, the Con-
3Greene v. Typographical Union and Local 285, supra, note 2, at 68,944.
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gressional intent to free employers and employees of the pressure
of organizational or recognitional picket lines requires that picket-
ing be deemed to be for an object prohibited by Section 8(b)(7),
if the union seeks either to persuade or to compel the employer to
recognize it or the employees to join it.
However, even though picketing is for an object forbidden by
Section 8(b) (7), it does not violate the Section if the union is cur-
rently certified as the representative of the employees. Does this
exception encompass the situation where the picketing union is
not certified, but has a contract with the employer which would
bar an election? The answer appears to be yes for the following
reason: The Labor Board and the Courts hold that during the term
of a contract which is a bar the employer must, absent unusual
circumstances, continue to recognize and to bargain with the in-
cumbent union although it is not certified. If the employer should
refuse to do so, and the union pickets, the Board would be disposed
to view the picketing as solely for the object of protesting the
employer's unfair labor practice. To the extent that the union may
be said to be seeking recognition, such would not be a true and
independent object of the picketing, inasmuch as no question con-
cerning representation would exist and the union would be entitled
to recognition as a matter of law.
Another question is: Does certification by a state agency im-
munize picketing under Section 8(b) (7) ? I believe that the answer
is yes, if the Labor Board would otherwise recognize the certifica-
tion. Section 8(b) (7) uses the term "currently certified", whereas
Section 8(b) (4) (B) and Section 8(b) (4) (C), which also regulate
recognitional picketing, speak of "certified under the provisions of
Section 9" of the Taft-Hartley Act, and thereby restrict their
applicability to certification by the Labor Board. It would seem
that if Congress intended a similar restriction upon Section 8(b)-
(7), it would have used similar or equivalent language. Moreover,
the Labor Board holds that where a union is certified by a state
agency, such certification will be accorded the same status as a
certification by the Board with respect to the employer's duty to
bargain and to the applicability of the one-year certification rule,
the one-year election rule, and the Board's contract-bar rules. The
same view must be taken where Section 8(b) (7) is involved, or
the status accorded a state certification would be vitiated. Such
was the holding of the Court in the recent Fowler Hotel Case.4
But suppose that a union has neither a certification nor a con-
tract, and that the employer unlawfully refuses to recognize it. To
4 Getreu v. Bartenders & Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local 58 (Fowler
Hotel, Inc.), 181 F. Supp. 738, 39 L.C. 69,038, (N.D. Ind. 1960).
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illustrate: A union requests recognition on the basis of a card check
which clearly establishes majority status. The employer refuses
in the context of unfair labor practices designed to dissipate the
union's majority and prevent a free election. The union begins to
picket for recognition and, meanwhile, files a Section 8(a) (5)
charge against the employer. The latter counters by filing a Sec-
tion 8(b) (7) charge against the union. Assuming that the 8(b) (7)
charge has merit, will the Labor Board process the charge and seek
to enjoin the picketing?
The answer appears to be no. It is my understanding that the
Board will defer action on the 8(b) (7) charge pending investiga-
tion of the 8(a) (5) charge. If the latter has merit and a complaint
issues alleging an unlawful refusal to bargain, the 8(b) (7) charge
will be dismissed as will be any petition filed by the employer or
another union. Meanwhile, the picketing may continue pending the
outcome of the 8(a) (5) proceeding.
Although it is difficult to square the Board's position with the
wording and legislative history of Section 10 (1), discussed here-
after, which indicates that the only employer unfair labor practice
available as a defense to an 8(b) (7) charge is a violation of Sec-
tion 8(a) (2), the Board's position appears to be sound and sensible.
The "bases" of an unlawful-refusal-to-bargain proceeding under
Section 8(a) (5) and an unlawful-recognitional-picketing proceed-
ing under Section 8(b) (7) are mutually inconsistent, since the
latter presupposes that the union is not lawfully entitled to recog-
nition or at least that the employer may lawfully withhold recogni-
tion pending the Labor Board's resolution of the representation
question in issue. Moreover, if the Board were to apply Section
8(b) (7) to the given situation, its action would be a futile gesture.
The 8(a) (5) charge, if meritorious, would block the holding of an
election and would cause the dismissal of a petition filed by the picket-
ing union to meet the requirements of Section 8(b) (7) (C) discussed
hereafter.
And this brings us to the conditions set forth in sub-paragraphs
(A), (B) and (C) of Section 8(b) (7). Sub-paragraph (A) pro-
scribes picketing for the forbidden objectives "where the employer
has lawfully recognized in accordance with this Act any other labor
organization and a question concerning representation may not
appropriately be raised under Section 9(c) of this Act". As ex-
plained by Secretary of Labor Mitchell, in his statement to the
Senate Labor Committee, Section 8(b) (7) (A) would not bar picket-
ing:
... if the incumbent union (a) was a minority union (a
union not designated as bargaining representative by an
1960]
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uncoerced majority of the employees), (b) was dominated or
assisted by the employer, (c) had established its majority
status by fraudulent means, (d) had an existing contract
which contained an illegal union security provision, (e) had
an existing contract which had been in effect for more than
two years, or (f) had suffered a schism because of its parent
organization's expulsion from the AFL-CIO on grounds of
corruption or Communist domination.5
In short, a union may picket for recognitional or organizational
purposes, although the employer has recognized another union, if
the other union is a minority union or a Section 8(a) (2) union or
if its contract would not bar the holding of an election. The length
of the picketing, however, would be limited by the conditions
specified in sub-paragraph (C) of Section 8(b) (7) described here-
after. Moreover, if the union being recognized has been certified
by the Labor Board, the picketing would violate Section 8(b) (4)-
(C) even though the aforementioned defenses would be available
under Section 8(b) (7) (A). The Labor Board interprets Section
8(b) (4) (C) as protecting an outstanding certification against col-
lateral attack through picketing, and nothing in the language or
legislative history of Section 8(b) (7) indicates that Congress in-
tended to reverse or to amend the Board's interpretation.
Sub-paragraph (b) of Section 8(b) (7) proscribes recognitional
or organizational picketing "where within the preceding twelve
months a valid election under Section 9(c) of this Act has been
conducted". As explained by Secretary of Labor Mitchell, Section
8(b) (7) (B) :
... would be operative for the most part when the election
had resulted in the certification of no union. If the election
had resulted in the certification of another union, picketing
for recognition would presently be barred under Section 8-
(b) (4) (C). If the picketing resulted in the certification of
the picketing union, picketing by the union would be permis-
sible as being directed against the employer's unfair labor
practice of refusal to recognize and bargain with it.'
Thus, a union which loses a valid election cannot picket for recog-
nitional or organizational purposes within twelve months a f t e r
conducting the election. If objections to the election are filed, the
union can continue to picket until the objections are ruled on, but
if they are overruled, the twelve-month period runs, as in the case
of the one-year election rule under Section 9(c) (3), from the date
of the election and not from the date of decision on the objections.7
5 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor, U.S. Senate, on S.505, et al.,
86th Congress, 1st Sess., p. 409.6 Ibid.
7See Senate Hearings. Id. at 241. See AIso Macatee, Inc., 127 NLRB No.
93. There the Labor Board rejected the Trial Examiner's recommended order
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Suppose the union loses the election and thereafter, but before
the expiration of the twelve-month period, acquires majority sup-
port. Can it then picket for recognition? The answer would appear
to be no. Senator Cooper proposed an amendment which would
have explicitly permitted this result, and it passed the Senate. But
the version which passed the House contained no such qualification
and the House version was adopted by the Congress.8 Suppose,
further, that a union which was not on the ballot in the election
had at the time, or thereafter acquired, majority support. May it
picket for recognition during the twelve-month period? The an-
swer is no, because any valid election within twelve months bars
picketing by any union.'
Sub-paragraph (C) of Section 8(b) (7), subject to two provisos
discussed hereafter, proscribes recognitional or organizational pic-
keting "where such picketing has been conducted without a petition
being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty
days from the commencement of such picketing". Thus, if the
picketing is not otherwise proscribed by Section 8(b) (7) (A) or by
Section 8(b) (7) (B), a union may picket for recognitional or or-
ganizational objectives for a reasonable period of time not to ex-
ceed thirty days. If no petition is filed within that time, the picket-
ing must stop. If, however, a timely petition is filed, the picketing
may continue until an election has been held and the results are
certified. Once that occurs, the picketing then becomes subject to
the limitations of Section 8(b) (7) (B) and also of Section 8(b) (4)-
(C) in the event that another union has been certified. The peti-
tion called for by Section 8(b) (7) (C) may be filed by the union, or
by the employer, or by one or more employees, or by a third party.
What constitutes a reasonable period of time? Or, to state the
question in the negative, what is an unreasonable delay in filing a
petition? The answer depends on the nature of the employer's
operations, on the circumstances of the picketing, and on the con-
sequences of the picketing. Where the picketing was characterized
by violence, one Court has held that ten days is an unreasonable
delay. 10 In another case involving a daily newspaper the Court
ruled that fifteen days was an unreasonable delay." In still another
which would have required the respondent union to cease and desist from
recognitional picketing under Secton 8(b) (7) (B) so long as the Board's Cer-
tification of Results remained in force and effect. The Board limited the
cease and desist order to a period of one year following the date of the elec-
tion.
8 §105 Cong. Rec., 5963-5965, (daily ed. April 24, 1959). §708(a) (7) (B)
of S.1555, as passed by the Senate.
9 §105 Cong. Rec. A7915; Id. at 421 (Question 36).
10 Cuneo v. United Shoe Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 181 F. Supp. 324, 39
L.C. 69,579 (N.J. 1960).
"1 Elliott v. Sapula Typographical Union No. 619, ITU, - F. Supp. -, 38 L.C.
66,020 (N.D. Okla. 1959).
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case where the employer sold and distributed automotive parts
and accessories and where the picketing did not stop deliveries,
the Court indicated that twenty-seven days was a reasonable period
within which to file a petition.? On the other hand, where the
picketing interferred with deliveries, the Courts have deemed it to
be a factor shortening the period within which a petition must be
filed.3
Suppose that a petition is not filed at all or that it is not filed
within a reasonable period of time. What happens? Nothing inso-
far as Section 8(b) (7) is concerned, unless a charge alleging a vio-
lation of Section 8(b) (7) (C) is filed. Absent such a charge, a peti-
tion, if filed, will be processed under Section 9(c) like any other
representation petition. The Labor Board holds that the filing of a
charge is pre-requisite to an expedited election under Section 8(b)-
(7) (C). 14 This position, although open to question, seems to re-
flect the intent of the Congress and is likely to receive the ultimate
approval of the Courts.
But assume that such a charge has been filed. Then what hap-
pens? If upon investigation the Labor Board's Regional Director
finds that the charge is without merit, in that the picketing is not
for recognitional or informational objectives, he will dismiss the
charge regardless of whether or not a timely petition has been
filed.' 5 A petition, if filed, will be processed under the regular pro-
visions of Section 9(c),16 and the picketing may continue unless it
causes a stoppage of deliveries. If it does, the picketing then be-
comes unlawful.
If, on the other hand, the Regional Director finds that the
charge is meritorious and further finds that a petition has not been
filed within a reasonable period of time, he will institute unfair
labor practice proceedings and will process the petition under the
regular provisions of Section 9(c). Meanwhile, he will seek an
injunction pursuant to Section 10(1) of the Taft-Hartley Act. This
Section authorizes injunction proceedings in Section 8(b) (7) cases,
whether sub-paragraph (A), or (B), or (C) is involved, except
where "a charge against the employer under Section 8(a) (2) has
been filed and after the preliminary investigation [the Regional
Director] has reasonable cause to believe that such charge is true
and that a complaint should issue". In the latter event the Regional
12 McLeod v. Local 239, IBT, supra, note 2.
13 Cuneo v. United Shoe Workers of America, AFL-CIO, supra, note 10, and
Elliott v. Sapula Typographical Union No. 619, ITU, supra, note 11.
14 §102.73 et seq., Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board,
as amended November 4, 1959.
25 Id., §102.74.
16 Ibid.
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Director may continue with the unfair labor practice proceedings,
but he may not seek an injunction to stop the picketing.
Nor may the Regional Director seek an injunction where a
petition has been filed within a reasonable period of time, although
he finds that the Section 8(b)(7)(C) charge otherwise has merit.
Instead, the Regional Director suspends further proceedings on
the charge and processes the petition in accordance with the first
proviso to Section 8(b) (7) (C).-7 This provides that, upon the filing
of a representation petition as called for by Section 8(b) (7) (C),
"the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of
Section 9(c) (1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest
on the part of the labor organization, direct an election in such
unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the re-
sults thereof". In sum, where a timely petition is filed in the face
of organizational or recognitional picketing, the Board must hold
a prompt election without regard to whether the picketing union
makes a 30 per cent showing of interest or claims to represent the
employees in question. The Board must, however, determine the
appropriate unit and, absent an agreement of the parties, fix eligi-
bility requirements.
May the Labor Board hold the election in advance of a hearing?
The Board believes that it may' and has so provided in its Rules
and Regulations. These Rules and Regulations authorize the Re-
gional Director, after he has completed his investigation, either to
set the petition down for hearing or to direct an immediate elec-
tion.' 9 In the latter event any party aggrieved may file with the
Board for special permission to appeal from the Regional Director's
determination. 20 ILthe petition is set down for hearing, the parties
are not allowed to file briefs without the special permission of the
Board, and instead they may state their respective legal positions
upon the record at the close of the hearing.2 ' The Board has fur-
ther expedited the election procedure under Section 8(b) (7) (C) by,
providing that the Regional Director's rulings on any objections
or challenged ballots shall be final unless the Board grants special
permission to appeal.'2 Finally, where an election has been di-
rected, the Regional Director dismisses the 8(b) (7) (C) charge.2 3
17Id., §102.75.is See Dept. & Specialty Store Employees Union, Local 1265 v. Brown, - F.
Supp. -, 40 L.C. 70,053 (N.D. Calif. 1960), where the Court refused to enjoin
the Labor Board from conducting a pre-hearing election under Section 8(b)(7) (C).
29 Supra note 14, §102.77(b).20 Id., §102.80(c).
21 Id., §102.77(c).
22 Id., §102.78.
23 Id., §102.81 (a).
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Suppose charges are filed alleging that the employer involved
has discriminatorily discharged certain union supporters or has
committed other unfair labor practices. The Regional Director
investigates the charges and finds them meritorious. Will he pro-
ceed with an election? The answer is no because the Labor Board
will not proceed with an election in the face of meritorious charges,
on the ground that the employer's conduct, if unlawful, would deny
the employees freedom of choice in the election. In such a situation
the picketing may continue until the unfair labor practices have
been remedied or otherwise disposed of, and a free election can be
held. This delay, which may run from several months to a year or
more, does tend to defeat the Congressional purpose of having
elections under Section 8(b) (7) (C) held as quickly as possible, but
it would be pointless for the Board to proceed with an election
which would subsequently have to be set aside because of the em-
ployer's unfair labor practices. The problem, however, can and
should be narrowed by the Board taking a more realistic view as
to what conduct by an employer will prevent a free election. At
the present time the Board considers any unfair labor practice, no
matter how trivial in nature or impact, a bar to an election. This
view accords with the Board's position that laboratory conditions
should prevail in representation elections, but it scarcely reflects
the realities of industrial life.
And this brings us to the second proviso to Section 8(b) (7) (C).
This proviso states that "nothing in this sub-paragraph (C) shall
be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the
purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers)
that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract
with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to
induce any individual employed by any other person in the course
of his employment, not to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods
or not to perform any services". In short, picketing which truth-
fully advises the public that a particular employer is non-union
may continue beyond a reasonable period of time, even beyond
thirty days, although no representation petition has been filed, as
long as it does not cause the employees of other employers to refuse
to cross the picket line. And this is true although the picketing
causes the public not to buy the employer's products or causes his
own employees not to go to work.
The proviso presents three principal questions for ultimate reso-
lution by the Labor Board and the Courts:
First, suppose that the picketing union intends to make only
an informational appeal and not to stop deliveries and takes every
step possible to avoid such a stoppage. Nevertheless, one or more
[Vol. 44
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employees of other employers refuse to cross the picket line. Does
this result deprive the picketing of its immunity? I believe that
the answer is yes, except in the situation where the picketed em-
ployer, or persons acting on his behalf, connive with employees of
other employers not to cross the picket line. Otherwise, one would
have to interpret the term "effect" in the second proviso as "in-
tended effect", and for such interpretation there does not appear
to be any warrant either in the language or the history of the pro-
viso.
Second, suppose that the picket signs truthfully state that the
employer is non-union but add some argumentative remarks and
some misstatements or fabrications. Or suppose that the picket
signs state that the employer does not have a contract with or
employ members of a labor organization, but whether he does is a
matter of dispute. Does the publicity in either instance lose its
immunity? I believe that the answer depends on the particular
facts and the specific circumstances of each case.
It seems obvious that Congress, aware as it must have been of
the realities of industrial life and the high protection given by the
Constitution to freedom of speech, did not intend to hold picketing
unions to absolute truth, nor to restrict their picket signs to the
precise words of the proviso, namely, that the employer "does not
employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization".
Not even the law of libel and slander or the law of perjury exact
so high or so unrealistic a standard. It seems more likely that Con-
gress intended, and that eventually the Labor Board and the
Courts will adopt, a standard somewhat as follows:
A picket sign will not be considered untruthful if: (1) the words
used may be fairly construed to mean that the employer does not
have a contract with or employ members of a labor organization;
(2) the question of whether he does, entails not questions of fact,
but matters of opinion or legal conclusion; (3) misstatements or
fabrications relate only to incidental and not to material facts;
(4) misrepresentation of material facts is attributable to action on
the part of the employer and not to the fault of the union; and (5)
argumentative remarks do not tend to mislead the public or other
employees as to the truth of material facts.
The third principal question presented by the second proviso
to Section 8(b) (7) (C) is as follows: Suppose that the picketing is
informational within the meaning of the proviso, but that, in addition,
it has a recognitional or organizational object. Does the picketing be-
come unlawful if it continues beyond a reasonable period of time with-
out a petition being filed? In the Fowler Hotel case Judge Swygert
19601
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answered the question in the negative. Judge Swygert reasoned as
follows:
* * * it is [the Labor Board's] position that the proviso
has no application where "an object" of the picketing is
recognition or bargaining and is carried on under circum-
stances proscribed by Section 8(b) (7). I do not so interpret
the statute. I think sub-paragraph (C) means that although
"an object" of picketing may be bargaining, as it admittedly
is in this case, it is immunized from the statute if "the pur-
pose" of such picketing is also truthfully to inform the public
that the employer does not have a contract with the union
and further if the picketing does not curtail picking up, de-
livery or transportation of goods or the performance of ser-
vices. It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine any kind of
informational picketing pertaining to an employer's failure
or refusal to employ union members or to have a collective
bargaining agreement where another object of such picket-
ing would not be ultimate union recognition or bargaining.
In most instances certainly the aim of such informational
picketing could only be to bring economic pressure upon the
employer to recognize and bargain with the labor organiza-
tion. To adopt [the Labor Board's] interpretation of sub-
paragraph (C) would make the second proviso entirely
meaningless.
2 4
However, Judge Bartels in the Stan-Jay case answered the ques-
tion in the affirmative. Judge Bartels reasoned as follows:
* . * Taken as a whole, the record presents a substantial
basis of believable evidence that the picketing after Novem-
ber 13th has for an objective the "forcing and requiring" of
Stan-Jay to recognize and bargain with the respondent. It is
true that this picketing may also be informational or advi-
sory in character and, as such, is permissible by the 1959
Act. However, this is irrelevant if such picketing also has
as one of its objectives an unfair labor practice .... Neither
the proviso in Section 8(b) (7) (C), the First Amendment to
the Constitution, nor the authorities cited justify non-coer-
cive speech or picketing in furtherance of an unlawful objec-
tive as described in the Act as amended. Congress did not
intend by the general language in the proviso in Section
8(b) (7) (C) to sanction that which it so expressly outlawed
in the specific language immediately preceding the proviso."
Which answer will ultimately prevail-Judge Swygert's or
Judge Bartels'? One hesitates to predict, and understandably so
in view of the proviso's legislative history which is more of a
weather vane than a compass.
24 Getreu v. Bartenders, supra, note 4, at pp. 69,037, 69,038.
25 McLeod v. Teamsters, Local 739, etc., supra, note 2, at pp. 69,158-69,159. See
also Penello v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 400, RCIA, AFL-CIO, 39
L.C. 69,302 (1960).
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The proviso was inserted during the conference of the Senate
and the House on the Landrum-Griffin bill. Shortly before the Con-
ference Agreement was concluded, the Senate Conferees, in a re-
port to the Senate, explained the effect of Section 8(b) (7) (C) includ-
ing its second proviso as follows:
The Senate Bill would forbid recognition or organization-
al picketing under two conditions: (i) When the employer
has a contract with another bona fide union which is a bar
to an election; and (ii) for 9 months after an election. The
House bill extended the 9 months to 12 and added a third
and fourth prohibition; (iii) to prohibit all organizational
picketing unless the union could prove that it had the sup-
port of 30 per cent of the employees; and (iv) to prohibit
organizational picketing after 30 days unless the union had
filed a petition for an election.
The proposal omits point (iii) and accepts point (iv) of
the House bill, except that picketing would be permitted to
continue without a petition if it appealed only to the employ-
ees to join the union or the public not to patronize the non-
union establishment without causing truckers or the employ-
ees of other employers to refuse to cross the picket line.
On organizational picketing then, we once again accept
the House version except for two propositions which are
fair and reasonable:
1. A union may use pickets in an effort to organize until
there is an election in which the NLRB can determine the
employees' wishes. But a union which is stopping truck
deliveries or other employees would not be allowed to avoid
an election.
2. Picketing in the absence of a contract or an election,
which has only the effect of notifying the public of non-union
conditions and asking the employees to join the union would
not be banned.26
Similarly, Senator Kennedy, during the debate on the Conference
Bill, stated:
... The House bill would have forbidden virtually all or-
ganizational picketing, even though the pickets did not stop
truck deliveries or exercise other economic coercion. The
amendments adopted in conference secure the right to engage
in all forms of organizational picketing up to the time of an
election in which the employees can freely express their de-
sires with respect to the choice of a bargaining representa-
tive. When the picketing results in economic pressure
through the refusal of other employees to cross the picket
line, the bill would require a prompt election. Purely infor-
mational picketing cannot be curtailed under the Conference
Report, although even this privilege would have been denied
by the Landrum-Griffin measure.
27
28 Cong. Rec. 15906-15908 (daily ed. August 28, 1959).
27 Id., 16,413 (daily ed. September 3, 1959).
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The overall meaning of these statements, particularly the em-
phasis on "organizational" and the silence on "recognitional"
picketing, seems to be that the second proviso was intended to
give the union an unqualified right under Section 8(b) (7) (C) to
engage in "organizational" but not in "recognitional" picketing, so
long as no deliveries were stopped and the signs used were not
untruthful.
28
On the other hand, there is also legislative history indicating
that the proviso was intended to apply to neither organizational
nor recognitional picketing but only to what might be termed
"standards" picketing. Thus, opponents of the Administration and
the Landrum-Griffin bills, in an effort to show the reach of those
bills, pointed out that they would prohibit a union from picketing
an employer to advertise to the public the existence of substandard
conditions. 9 Moreover, these same persons were aware of the fact
that, under the Labor Board's Lewis Food decision, 30 picketing for
a lawful object can be transmuted into illegal picketing by finding
another illegal object. 31
In these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the second
proviso was inserted to make sure that, even though the opening para-
graph of Section 8(b) (7) did not appear to reach standards picketing,
such picketing would nevertheless not be brought in under a loose
application of the "an object" test in the situation where a protest
against substandard conditions was most defensible, i.e., where the
employer was not recognizing another union and there had not been
a Board election within the preceding 12 months.
The inference that the second proviso covers purely an appeal to
the public respecting substandard conditions is indicated by other evi-
dence. At times the legislative history speaks not only of organizational
picketing, but also of "informational picketing," thereby perhaps indi-
28 It is clear, however, that the second proviso does not apply to picketing under
Section 8(b) (7) (A) or (B), if the picketing be "organizational" or "recogni-
tional." This conclusion is confirmed not only by the language of the proviso(That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed etc.) which ex-
pressly limits its application to Section 8(b) (7) (C), but also by the state-
ments quoted above and particularly the statement of Representative Griffin
that the proviso "pertains to subsection (C) only and therefore consumer
appeals for organizational or recognitional purposes are banned after an elec-
tion." 105 Cong. Rec. A7915 (daily ed. September 10, 1959). But whether purely
informational picketing is banned under Section 8(b) (7) (A) or (B) is, of
course, another question. In Alton Myers Bros., Inc., 14-CP-1, the General
Counsel of the Labor Board appears to have taken the position that such
picketing is banned. The Trial Examiner held to the contrary. The case is
now pending decision by the Board.29 See Cong Rec. 5952-5953 (Sen. Kennedy) (daily ed. April 24, 1959); Hear-
ings before Subcommittee on Labor, U.S. Senate, supra, note 5 at 354-355,
362, 413, 422.30 Lewis Food Co., 115 NLRB 890.
31 See Hearings, supra, note 5 at 334-335.
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cating a category of picketing which is neither for recognitional nor
for organizational purposes. Moreover, the comments by Michael Bern-
stein, Senate Minority Counsel, published in the U.S. News & World
Report, and later reprinted in the Congressional Record by Senator
Goldwater are as follows respecting the second proviso:
If the union makes it clear that it doesn't fall under [sub-
section A or B], the union may then picket indefinitely, pro-
vided its signs and its literature and its appeals make it plain
that all it is seeking to do is to advise the consuming public
that the employer does not employ union workers or that he has
not got a collective-bargaining agreement with the union. It
may not be for organizational or recognitional purposes. 32
Additional legislative history can be cited, but, like that already
considered, it is ambiguous and ambivalent. Arguments can also be
drawn from the statutory language but they are likewise inconclusive
since the language lends itself to varying interpretations. It would
seem then that as of now any answer is at best an educated guess.
My guess is that the second proviso to Section 8(b) (7) (C) does
not permit informational picketing for either organizational or recog-
nitional objectives except where and to the extent that such objectives
are the incidental and indirect results of the picketing. In short, to
come within the proviso, the picketing must seek directly to inform
the public and not to organize the particular employees, or to gain
recognition from the particular employer. The latter purposes may be
the long-range goals of the union, in that any union activity has for
its ultimate purpose the advancement of the labor movement through
organizing and recognition, but they may not be the present objectives
without forfeiting the protection of the proviso.
There are other questions that can be asked about organizational
and recognitional picketing under Section 8(b) (7), and still more
questions will arise as the Section is applied to new and novel situ-
ations. All these questions must await the elucidating process of litiga-
tion, as Justice Frankfurter would say, for final and authoritative an-
swers. Meanwhile, as practitioners in the field of labor law, we can
and should aid the process by being industrious and inventive in de-
veloping and advocating our own answers. We will thereby fulfill what
I deem to be the true role of a lawyer, namely, to mold rather than
merely to find the law.
32 105 Cong. Ree. A8357, A8358 (daily ed. September 24, 1959).
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